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Abstract
The increasing use of encryption and obfuscation within the malware development arena has necessitated the use
of volatile memory acquisition on smartphone platforms. Current smartphone forensics research lacks a wellformulated process for the acquisition of volatile memory. This research evaluates and contrasts three differing
tools for acquisition of volatile memory from the Android platform: Live Response, Linux Memory Extractor
(LiME) and Mem Tool. Evaluation is conducted through practical examination during the analysis of an infected
device. The results demonstrate a combination of LiME and the Volatility Framework provides the most robust
findings. Complexities due to the nature of LiME prevent it from being a feasible tool for real-world use. In
contrast, Live Response is found to be reliable and applicable to real-world scenarios. In all evaluations, it was
found that the forensic practitioner must take care to understand and be aware of the impact to data stored
within volatile memory caused by the acquisition process.
Keywords
Android, Smartphone Forensics, Live Response, Linux Memory Extractor (LiME), Mem tool, Volatility
Framework, Volatile memory, Backdoor.AndroidOS.Obad

INTRODUCTION
According to Hoog (2011), there are two classifications for storing the data on an Android device: data at rest
and data in transit. Data at rest is stored data in several storage media such as internal flash memory (NANDflash or NOR-flash Memory), memory card (SD card), embedded multimedia card (eMMC), Universal
Integrated Circuit Card (UICC), and data backups. Furthermore, data on Android devices can be classified as
data in transit if it is stored in a Network Service Provider (NSP) and as Random Access Memory (RAM) as a
store of volatile memory.
Many well-known computer forensic guidelines such as Justice (2008), Group (2002) and Cichonski, Millar,
TimGrance, and Scarfone (2012) propose the importance of prioritising the acquisition of memory based on its
volatility. In contrast, a few well-known of the mobile phone forensics guidance such as (SWGDE) (2013) and
Ayers, Brothers, and Jansen (2014) do not state the same approach. As a consequence, many smartphone
forensics workflows or approaches are still focusing on non-volatile memory acquisition.
As the Android smartphone become ubiquitous, there is an immense growth of the malware that mainly targeted
the Android devices. According to Cisco (2014), ninety-nine percent of all mobile malware in 2013 targeted
Android devices. Android users also have the highest encounter rate (71%) with all form of web-delivered
malware. On the other hand, there is another perspective for the forensic community in regards with advanced
malware. Nasim, Aslam, Ahmed, and Naeem (2015) reveals one code obfuscation technique called packing that
enables a malware author to mangle an executable is such a way that it becomes difficult for an analyst to
reverse engineer. In addition, Burdach (2006) reveals rootkits and worms that store their code only in volatile
memory. This obfuscation technique has rendered the traditional forensics approach of offline analysis
insufficient. Thus, volatile memory acquisition in Android devices suspected to be infected with malware is
highly recommended.
The paper aims to address the following research questions:




What are the proper forensics approaches for acquisition and analysis of volatile memory on Android
devices in exposed with Malware incidents?
What is the advantages and disadvantages of three different approaches: Live Response, Mem Tool,
and LiME/Volatility for memory forensics on Android devices?
What is the final result from comparison of the analysis’ output from the three different approaches?
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How is the feasibility evaluation for each approach in real case scenario?

RELATED WORKS
Aljaedi et al. (2011) have performed comparative analysis in Live Response and memory imaging on Linux
desktop environment. The research reveals the advancement of memory imaging in comparison with a Live
Response. It stated that Live Response approach does not include hidden and terminated processes. Moreover,
the average percentage of changed pages during Live Response is higher than memory imaging as shown in
Figure 1. This data suggests memory imaging had less of an impact on volatile data.

Figure 1: Comparison of pages changed during Live Response and memory imaging (Aljaedi et al., 2011)

Sylve, Case, Marziale, and Richard (2012) presented Linux Memory Extractor (LiME) as a means to obtain
complete captures of volatile memory along with a subsequent analysis of that data in both userland and the
kernel. The tool offers two significant advancements: forensic soundness of acquisition approach and the
completeness of pages acquisition in comparison with other tools. Wächter (2015) concluded that memory
forensics with LiME is not feasible for law enforcement purposes. He found seven factors that might deter the
usage of LiME: identifying the model, identifying Operating System (OS), root exploit, lock screen, availability
or sources, kernel configuration and evidence erosion.

LIVE RESPONSE, LINUX MEMORY EXTRACTOR (LiME) AND MEM TOOL
Live Response
Live Response is a method of acquiring volatile data, whereby the suspect operating system is acquired for
potential evidence such as the status of open network connections, the status of open files, the system's
conception of the current date and time, and any other forensically relevant volatile data. However, it is well
understood that acquiring volatile data is inherently problematic because it relies on a potentially compromised,
and thus untrusted OS and that therefore the acquired evidence could be contaminated during this information
gathering process, and because it is not a repeatable process (Nagy et al., 2014).
According to Case (2012a), malware can trivially default live analysis, because it is running tools built into the
OS to gather volatile data. Hence, it is possible that malware can hide its presence to any and all userland tools
and even in-kernel monitors. Moreover, many advanced malware only operates in the volatile memory; they
might never touch the non-volatile memory, and all their network traffic has been encrypted. As a conclusion,
the memory acquisition becomes the need and critical for handling the malware incident.

Linux Memory Extractor (LiME)
Some researchers have proposed tools and procedures to acquire volatile memory to overcome the limitations on
the Live Response. Leppert (2012) proposes using Dalvik Debug Monitor Service (DDMS) in the Android
Software Development Kit (SDK) for acquiring the heap dump as a dumping file of the volatile memory in
Android devices. However, according to Macht (2013), Leppert’s approach contains some flaws. At first, the
approach only feasible for the debugging application process. Hence, it only feasible for an application that has
been prepared for debugging. Secondly, the acquisition process cannot obtain comprehensive artefacts such as
complete class objects or binary data. As a conclusion, the following analysis will be limited since it came from
the limited data acquisition.
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Thing, Ng, and Chang (2010) develop the acquisition tool called memgrab. It aims to dump the process’
memory in the Android devices. A workflow of the tools consists of two consecutive steps. First, the tool will
trace the process memory and acquire it based on the /proc/pid/maps and /proc/pid/mem files. Second, the tool
deploys the Process Trace (ptrace) system call, which enable the locating of the process by monitoring its
execution, as well as gaining access to its address space. Furthermore, the researchers investigated the cached
data and the volatile memory persistence in Android smartphone.
Sylve et al. (2012) reveal several issues with Thing’s research. First, significant information such as in-kernel
structures, networking information, and others are not analysed. Second, the memgrab requires many
interactions with the live system that potentially change the data. This last issue creates a significant concern
regarding with forensically sound process requirement. Hence, they propose Android memory acquisition
module called Droid Mobile Dumpster (DMD) or known as Linux Memory Extractor (LiME) to overcome all
the limitations. The research claimed that LiME can dump the address memory over TCP and to an Android
device’s SD card. Moreover, it offers thoughts on the forensic soundness of the approach. LiME works in three
consecutive steps. First is parsing the kernel’s iomem_resource structure to learn the physical memory address
ranges of system RAM. Second is performing physical to virtual address translation for each page of memory.
Third is reading all pages in each range and writing them to either a file (typically on device’s SD card) or a
TCP socket.
There is a significant challenge on LiME especially for loading the module into the kernel. There is a security
mechanism for the kernel in the Android OS that preventing incompatible module or suspected malicious code
to be loaded into the OS. Although there were attempts to bypass the security mechanism, none of the attempts
is perfect. Also, there is no research for creating a module in a kernel-agnostic feature (Sylve et al., 2012).

Mem Tool
Tamma and Tindall (2015) propose the use of Mem Tool as an alternative tool to dump the process files on the
RAM. Mem tool is an executable binary that needs to push to the device and with netcat tool-the mem is used to
dump the selected processes based on its PID. Moreover, it claimed has the capability to read the entire RAM or
target specific. There is no current research or discussion that shown the risk and benefit that might occur from
the Mem tool. Based on the experiment, the Mem tool is relied on the current processes similar with the Live
Response and has many interactions with the live data. Therefore, it depends on the running OS and potentially
can change the data on the RAM. However, the tool offers a repeatability function by dumping the running
processes.

RESUME OF ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES
Based on the related research as described above, the research resumes the requirement including the advantages
and disadvantages of each approach. Every examiner should understand this conditions to justify their selected
procedure and finally can minimise the risk that might occur from a selected approach.
Table 1: Advantages and Disadvantages of Live Response, LiME and Mem tool
No

Variables

Live Response

LiME

Mem Tool

1
2
3
4
5

Yes
No
Yes
Low
No

Yes
Yes
No
High
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Medium
No

High

Low

Medium

Low
~

High
High

Medium
~
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USB debugging requirement
Root access requirement
Kernel agnostic
Forensically soundness
Detection ability for cached
and terminated process
Impact on current Live
Memory
Implementation complexity
Completeness (Pages
Acquired)
Analysis result

Limited

Robust

10

Repeatability

No

Yes

Limited on Strings
Output
Yes

6
7
8

7

RESEARCH METHOD
The research conducted an experiment for supporting the comparison analysis of the three approaches. The
research method for the experiment shown in Figure 2. There are two scenarios for the experiment. The first
scenario uses LiME as the first tool to acquire the RAM and followed by Live Response to acquire the volatile
data based on the running OS. The second scenario uses Mem tool as the initial tool to acquire the running
processes and followed by Live Response. There is an additional procedure for comparing two output of the
Live Response: before and after the malware infection. The purpose of this comparison is acquiring the detail
information of all changes that have been made on the device by the malware.
ACQUISITION

ANALYSIS

Comparison of Live Response
Live Response
Before
Infection

Live Response
Comparison
Data Analysis

Live Response
After Infection

1st Scenario
PREPARATION

LiME

Volatility

Volatility
Output
Analysis

FINAL OUTPUT
ANALYSIS

Live Response
1st Scenario
Data Analysis

Live
Response

REPORT

2nd Scenario

mem

Strings

Strings
Output Data
Analysis

END

Live Response
2nd Scenario
Data Analysis

Live
Response

Figure 2: Research Method
Forensic Workstation: Linux Ubuntu 14.04 LTS 64-bit, RAM: 8 GB, CPU: Intel Core i7 CPU Q720 @
1.60GHz x 8. Testbeds: Android Virtual Device/AVD with the configuration: CPU:armeabi-v7a, Target:
Android 5.0.1(API level 2), Device Name: Google Nexus S with skin 480x800, SDCard: 2GB, RAM:1024MB,
VM heap size: 64, Data Partition size: 512MB. The research used the AVD with the same configuration for all
examination’s scenario.
Forensic tools:
a. Android Debug Bridge (ADB) for the Live Response acquisition;
b. Linux Memory Extractor (LiME) for memory acquisition and Volatility for analysing the acquired
memory;
c. Mem tool for dumping the processes and Autopsy 3.1.0 for analysing the dumped files;
d. Kdiff3 for comparing Live Response acquisition before and after infection.
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Malware Sample
Overview
The technical name for the malware is Backdoor.AndroidOS.Obad. The malware author used a previously
unknown vulnerability in Android that allowed the malware to gain extended device administrator privileges.
All strings in the executable file of the malware were encrypted, and the code was obfuscated. It has multifunctional capability such as sending SMS to premium-rate numbers, downloading other malware programs,
install them on the infected device and/or sending them further via Bluetooth. This malware sample does not
have a graphical user interface and operates as a background service (Sims, 2013; Unuchek, 2013).
Anti-Analysis Techniques and Behaviour
OBAD is an emulator-aware malware, which increases the complexity of analysis. The malware looks for the
“Android.os.build.MODEL” value throughout the code and exits if it matches with the emulator's model. The
malware can only be run in an emulator after patching several of checks. The malware sends information
including the victims IMEI number, operator name, MAC address of the Bluetooth device and the prepaid card
account balance of the user in an encrypted JSON form. In response, the malware author sends another JSON
object that contains configuration information alongside the commands to be executed.

PROCEDURES IN LIVE RESPONSE
The research following the guidance from Hubbard (2013), Kercher (2013) and Nagy et al. (2014) that includes
specific ADB commands for gathering the Live Response information. Since Live Response can overwrite the
unallocated data in the RAM, the examiner should be aware of their actions to minimise the impact on the
system.

PROCEDURES IN LIME AND VOLATILITY
The procedure for LiME follows the guidance from 504ensicsLabs (2014), Case (2012b), Valenzuela (2013)
and Wächter (2015). The research found that the thesis from Wächter is the most feasible guideline in
comparison with the previous guidelines available. For analysing the LiME file, the research uses the instruction
and guidelines from Volatility (2013) and Ligh et al. (2014).

PROCEDURES IN MEM TOOL
First of all, the Mem tool and NC tool should be installed on the /dev/ directory. It is tmpfs file directory that
means the directory only persisted as long as the device has not been rebooted. The main purpose of this
procedure is to avoid both tools to overwrite potential evidence on non-temporary file system’s directory.
According to with the documentation file of the tool, if the examiner set O for the PID then it can dump the
entirety of memory. Unfortionalty this did not appear to be the case regarding implementation, as such processes
were dumped on an individual basis.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Analysis Output
a. List of processes
The Live Response can obtain detail information regarding all processes that related with the malware sample.
Especially the ps –t command that can list whole related process including the processes that will diminish
afterward. Figure 3 shows the detail processes that related with the malware. Examiner can see the similarity of
all process based on its User ID (u0_a53) and PPID (1585).
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Figure 3: Live Response: ps –t command
LiME/Volatility (plugin: pid hash table) gives the similar output: name, PID and UID of the related processes as
shown in Figure 4. Alongside with the detail of memory address of the process (offset and Directory Table
Base/DTB). Not disclosed by Live Response is the start time. This information is significant for the examiner to
know when the malware and its related process are starting and identified all the process that related with the
malware based on the sequence of the start time.

Figure 4: Volatility Plugin: PID Hash Table

On the Autopsy, the whole bin files from Mem tool’s acquisition have been processed as a single case. After
searching based on the keyword “system.admin,” there are seven processes that might relate with the malware
as shown in Table 2 below:
Table 2: Mem Tool: Using keyword for searching “system.admin”
Keyword
system.admin

Hits

PID

Process Name

104

1541

com.android.system.admin

1578

com.android.settings

341

system.server

664

com.android.input.method.latin

69

zygote

708

com.android.phone

916

com.android.systemui
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b. APK (Package) Detail
Live Response uses adb command: “dumpsys package ” and obtained the Android package file of the malware.
It includes detail information such as the time stamp, first installed date, the last update time, etc. Moreover, the
information such as the permissions that have been granted and the Android component such as intent and
action are disclosed on the output file. The similar information could be gathered by examiner through static
malware analysis.
c. C&C Server
This information is significant to reveal who is might responsible or involved with such incidents. Most of
Trojans require C&C server to receive and to send data or files. However, the Live Response cannot reveal the
information of C&C server. In contrast, LiME and Mem tool reveal how the process
(com.android.system.admin) send the key cipher, the balance of prepaid SMS/MMS and other victim’s
credential to the C&C server (www.androfox.com and www.androfox.tk). Through Volatility’s plugin:
yara_scan –Y “http”, the examiner can obtain three findings based on the keyword search “androfox.” Figure 6
shows the example of the finding.

Figure 5: Volatility’s plugin: yara_scan –Y “http”

The Mem tool provides the similar findings as LiME/Volatility. After the first launch, the malware sample
collects information such as MAC address of the Bluetooth device, the name of the operator, telephone number,
IMEI, phone users account balance, whether or not Device Administrator has been obtained, and local time. All
this information is sent to the C&C server (www.androfox.tk or www.androfox.com) in the form on an
encrypted JSON object. After sending the information, the malware receives an instruction from the C&C server
and records them in the database. Each instruction recorded in the database contains the instructions sequence
number: the time when it must execute as ordered by C&C server and parameters (Unuchek, 2013). However,
during the examination process, there is no instruction have been received by the malware.
d. Network Information
Live response with netstat commands only reveals the IP Address of the devices and Internet Service Provider
without any information about third party IP Address that might relate with the incident.
In contrast, with plugin route cache in Volatility, the examiner found a particular IP Address: 195.20.46.245 that
might relate with the incident. After checking those IP Address, apparently it has been already listed on the
Blacklist Check.
e. Packets Sent through Sockets
The detail processes can be gathered from lsof command on the Live Response. It shows how the malware
attempts to connect its C&C server through the socket with file descriptor. However, from the output file it is
shown that not all sockets are active. Hence, there may be no packets transmitted via those sockets at the time of
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analysis (Unuchek, 2013). This feature shows the advancement of Live Response from LiMe/Volatility and
Mem Tool.
LiME/Volatility with the plugin lsof reveals the similar output. Although there are two differences from Live
Response’s output: First, there is no information whether the process is active or not (on/off); second, there is
information about the size of the related process. However, it is not clear the cause of the differences: whether
the plugin lsof did not parsing the information or the LiME did not dump the information.
With the Autopsy and based on the keywords search of “androfox” and “system.admin,” there are several hits
in related processes that obtained from the bin files. Moreover, with regular expression search of “URL”, there
is one hit in the related process (as shown in Table 3 below).
Table 3: Mem Tool-Keyword/Regex Search

Keyword
androfox
system.admin

Hits

PID

Process Name

20

1541

com.android.system.admin

104

1541

com.android.system.admin

1578

com.android.settings

341

system.server

664

com.android.input.method.latin

69

zygote

708

com.android.phone

916

com.android.systemui

Regex: URL
f. Time Events
LiME/Volatility is the only tool that can reveal the time events of processes and services that related with the
malware. Therefore, the examiner can reconstruct the incidents and easily identify the related processes or
services based on the time events.

CONCLUSION
LiME and Volatility show the most robust findings for answering the investigative questions. Moreover, LiME
has a repeatability feature that enable examiner or another examiner to do further analysis or re-analyse the
memory dumps. However, LiME is not feasible for real world use for many reasons. Thus, the research suggests
deploying LiME and Volatility Framework as a part of dynamic malware analysis only.
Live Response shows the less effective findings than LiME. Although providing less output overall, Live
Response did provide some findings not found by LiME/Volatility. Significant advantages from Live Response
are the implementation is far less complex and does not need root access. Mem Tool shows the least robust
findings comparing with the two previous approaches. Mem Tool Allows for repeatability much like LiME. If
root access is available, then acquisition can be performed with minimal impact on the state of the system
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